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We address the issue of the dynamics of wealth accumulation and economic crisis triggered by
extreme inequality, attempting to stick to most possibly intrinsic assumptions. Our general frame-
work is that of pure or modified multiplicative processes, basically geometric Brownian motions.
In contrast with the usual approach of injecting into such stochastic agent models either specific,
idiosyncratic internal nonlinear interaction patterns, or macroscopic disruptive features, we propose
a dynamic inequality model where the attainment of a sizable fraction of the total wealth by very
few agents induces a crisis regime with strong intermittency, the explicit coupling between the rich-
est and the rest being a mere normalization mechanism, hence with minimal extrinsic assumptions.
The model thus harnesses the recognized lack of ergodicity of geometric Brownian motions. It also
provides a statistical intuition to the consequences of Thomas Piketty’s recent “r > g” (return
rate > growth rate) paradigmatic analysis of very-long-term wealth trends. We suggest that the
“water-divide” of wealth flow may define effective classes, making an objective entry point to cali-
brate the model. Consistently, we check that a tax mechanism associated to a few percent relative
bias on elementary daily transactions is able to slow or stop the build-up of large wealth. When
extreme fluctuations are tamed down to a stationary regime with sizable but steadier inequalities, it
should still offer opportunities to study the dynamics of crisis and the inner effective classes induced
through external or internal factors.
PACS numbers: 42.79
I. INTRODUCTION
Mathematical models for economy using microscopic
agent-based descriptions have attracted a lot of attention
in the last few decades [1–12]. They draw on the rich
tools of physics to describe some characteristic observed
trends in several complex fields. Notably, various features
of the statistical distribution of wealth among individuals
or entities (firms, cities, etc.), especially those featuring
power-law distributions (Pareto tails or Zipf’s law), have
been studied within assumptions of simple stochastic in-
gredients [13–17].
Furthermore, nowadays, the degree of inequality in
wealth distribution as well as its evolution are issues of
growing interest. A witness of this worldwide interest,
beside the echo of extreme wealth inequality as yearly
reported by Oxfam for instance, is the success of Thomas
Piketty’s analysis [18, 19], namely the “r > g” paradigm
(where r is the return rate of capital and g the growth
rate of the whole economy): from a “law” that is de-
ceivingly simple, historical analysis of long-time series of
patrimonial wealth and incomes across centuries suggests
that its implications at the multi-decadal scale are pos-
sibly very large.
Adverse or beneficial consequences of inequality in
agent-based models are mostly thought in terms of some
explicit extra variable(s) with threshold or similar pro-
cedures that amount, from a physicist’s point of view,
to nonlinearity. The economics narrative translates this
in various ways, within current political biases [20]: The
“trickle down” effect suggests that any “added value”
created by the large means of the affluent shall, sooner
or later, diffuse down all social strata of society and incur
an overall benefit. Features that can be explicitly consid-
ered are for instance the advent of monopolies and how
their adverse effects on competition, pricing, innovation,
firm creation and death can be tracked. Note also that
a majority of wealth distribution studies stick to a static
view, even if fine rendering of actual data is sought, in-
cluding for instance the role of inheritance and bequest
strategy [21].
The generic idea that such nonlinearities or extra para-
metric bias then induce crisis, and change the growth
regime from smooth to moderately or highly intermit-
tent, has been acknowledged generically in the broad
wake of John Maynard Keynes, and specifically by the
economist Hyman Minsky. More recently, the work
by the “heterodox” economist Steve Keen could sub-
stantiate recent trends in escaping the “representative
agent model” and its questionable ability to describe
crisis mechanisms. In statistical econophysics mod-
els, the “wealth condensation”, that describes the ad-
vent of extreme events, extreme inequality in particu-
lar [3, 9, 18, 22], emerged in the first years of the disci-
pline.
However, the lure of describing accurately Pareto tails
or other fat tails epitomizing inequality led to the dy-
namics of wealth distribution being rarely investigated
until a few years ago. The input of econophysics hinged
a lot on equilibrium thermodynamics, with its ability to
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2bridge micro to macro and predict emergences such as
phase transitions for instance. So, non equilibrium ther-
modynamics, that is, how wealth distributions adapt to
permanently moving landscapes and possibly never relax
to a steady state, was rather left aside.
A compounded effect on this state of affair is the fact
that the Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) of “agent”
ensembles, a tenet of stochastic studies of wealth distri-
butions, leads, when left to evolve freely, to nonstationary
distributions: essentially log-normal distributions with
drift and broadening width over time. The lack of ergod-
icity of these ensemble distributions was recently pointed
out (i.e. the average wealth of a population at time t does
not converge at all, at large times, to the same value
as the average of individual asymptotic fates). This is
mathematically no more than an issue of noncommuting
limits [23]. But the lack of recognition of this issue has
plausibly induced several weaknesses in mainstream eco-
nomics, as recently pointed out [24, 25], the most striking
being the outright rejection of diverging utility functions
in models. Studying the heart of the topic, conversely,
led to a possibly more intrinsic metric of inequality based
on the logarithm [24, 25].
Practically, it is of course desirable to confront the
“socially agnostic” GBM distributions to a description
of growing inequalities [26]. This can be done by at-
tempting to track the large inequality modulations in the
last century through a reallocation mechanism acting as
a restoring force [27]. Doing so, it appears that, even
without any social bias such as lower education of the
poor class or the likes, the best description of the last
four decades is one of diverging inequality and negative
reallocation. The chiasm is large compared to a con-
ventional “adiabatic” picture of a stationary distribution
that would evolve close to a local equilibrium with gen-
tle disturbances from economic factors addressed through
various “output gaps” [27].
The relevance of models in relation with their dynam-
ics rather than their equilibrium distribution is also ad-
dressed by Ref. [26], as the study finds that any bare
GBM would cause too slow a dynamic, once a plausi-
ble stationary calibration of the GBM is done. Only
by introducing a nonlinearity related to an inner soci-
ety structure, can the dynamics be appropriately fitted.
The work by Liu and Serota [28] shows that nontrivial
nonstationary mathematical distributions can be char-
acterized through the time-constants and correlations of
their momenta. So the issue of modelling (and calibrat-
ing) both the transverse (population) and longitudinal
(time-dependent) wealth distributions is becoming the
minimally significant scope to exploit such models and
get insight from them.
Along this scope, it seems logical to explore all the
dynamics of GBM-based models, and notably involving
their most striking feature, related to non ergodicity, the
inequality “condensation”, whereby the wealthiest indi-
FIG. 1. (Color online) (a) Gaussian distribution of w−wp at
increasing times as indicated (log-scale), with β = 0.06 and
initial distribution concentrated at w1; (b) Wealth distribu-
tion P (w) on a linear scale.
viduals not only capture a large fraction of the total,
but also generate the largest positive or negative fluctua-
tions. For instance, there is no clear intuition whether a
few time-constants can be relevant to describe realistics
dynamics, or if a wilder evolution, with a “noisy” spec-
trum is the better picture. It is therefore interesting to
exploit the background of GBMs to explore such issues,
with the view that they can reveal subsets and dynamics
that are not an obvious part of the conventional wisdom
in the way the science of complex systems is applied to
economics.
In this paper, we focus in the spirit exposed above on a
model whose intermittence is related to high inequality,
but whose nonlinearity is as implicit as possible. We thus
avoid to cast a moral stance on microscopic behaviors
and their intended modifications. Still, we believe that
the way it reveals the dynamics of inequality suggests a
vision of the diagnoses to be made in actual economies
and of the possible counter-measures to be associated.
Such visions could help broadening the much demanded
alternative points of view to the so-called conventional
wisdom.
In a nutshell, we examine a model whereby, according
to the oxymoronic say, “the tail is wagging the dog”, i.e.,
the presence of a tail of a few very large wealth moves the
distribution as a whole. Its discrete nature can be antic-
3ipated to blur simplified collective dynamics, e.g. those
with simple time constants. The interest of this emphasis
is to attract the attention to the general features (in time
and in instantaneous distribution) that are likely to link
excessive inequality and a situation of uninterrupted cri-
sis reminiscent of the last decades of worldwide economic
troubles. Generality is granted here by simplicity, not
taking the bias of a “mean-field” approach with an aver-
age representative agent, but rather outlining the “space-
time” roles of the extremes [29]. Further mapping on var-
ious topologies of networks [10, 30] could of course help
understanding, as well as a cross-analysis with emerging
GBM dynamics studies [21, 26, 27]. Our exploitation will
be to identify a “water divide” of wealth flow, opening
opportunities to view the separated “basins” as classes.
The basis of our model is a simple set of N random
multiplicative processes that describe the daily fate of
agents wealth [1, 2, 5–11, 17, 31]. Needless to say, multi-
plicative process are associated to interest rates, but as
is usual for GBMs in this context, we do not model any-
thing but “wealth”, and have no time horizon (i.e. no
long term correlation, finite agent life, etc.) in micro-
scopic features. If we denote wj(t) generic variables at
integer times t (days) submitted to a multiplicative pro-
cess, described by a probability distribution Π(λ)dλ to
get wj(t + 1) = λwj(t), we have an additive process by
considering their logarithm xj = log(wj). We initially
stick to the balanced case where the average gain ex-
pectancy of agents is zero, that is
∫
λΠ(λ)dλ = 1 [15, 16].
This makes more clear the dynamic role of extremes, as
the primary evolution without sizable extremes in the
distribution is a gentle unstructured noise, compatible
with the impression of a fair game.
In Section II, based on the known log-normal distribu-
tion, we develop what happens in this fully independent
but yet discretized evolution [15]: We give a few “cali-
bration” hints to justify a rather high daily “bet”, inde-
pendent of the Kelly criterion, noting the unsatisfactory
status of time constant calibration [27]. We explain what
happens when starting from an idealized Dirac-type egal-
itarian wealth distribution P (w) (much as in [23, 25, 27]
accounts). We use the underlying log-normal distribu-
tion of xj , which has a residual nonzero drift because∫
`pi(`)d` < 0 , where ` = log(λ) describes the additive
process deriving from the multiplicative one [1, 2, 14–16].
The evolution of this distribution causes a strong inter-
mittency regime occurring when the wealthiest agents
reach a large fraction of total wealth [3, 10]. The drift
component results, at long times, in a global impover-
ishment of all agents. We assess the role of log(N) in
determining essential time constants. Note that we im-
pose a nonzero (“floor”) lower wealth. Although it has
no influence in this Sec.II, it is consistent with the next
sections and affects the post-condensation fate.
In Section III, we introduce the simple feedback mech-
anism of normalizing the average wealth to its initial
value [5, 9, 13, 15, 29, 30]. We show that this results in
endless intermittency that affects the whole wealth spec-
trum. Here, our “wealth floor” plays a dynamical role, as
it provides a flux even after a large collapse. We confirm
the picture that “the tail is wagging the dog”, i.e., that
the wealthiest agent fluctuations are those that impact
on the rest, by studying the correlation of ordered wealth
series. There are two aspects here: first, we observe how
the dynamics can be momentarily much shorter than the
log(N) one. Secondly, we identify a “water divide” of
wealth flow. There is therefore an effective closure be-
tween system size (thus, N), system collective dynamics
(crisis and intermittency), and this inner divide.
In Section IV, we deduce how a damping mechanism
could act, and summarize the possible meaning and use of
the results in Sec.V. If our diagnosis holds, then prevent-
ing the build-up of too large entities should be averted.
A brief “stylization” discussion is made [18–20, 22, 30].
Our choice in Section IV is to bias the daily “exchange”,
which has zero-change expectation in the non-damped
model [
∫
λΠ(λ)dλ = 1]. We do so by favoring a small
gain of the poorest, and a small loss of the richest, by
an amount which is very small (0.5-2%) compared to
the daily “bet”. This choice was inspired by the pric-
ing mechanisms introduced by Aristotle, whereby the
price has no absolute underlying reference that the mar-
ket should “discover”, but is rather related to the “social
status” of the agent, as Paul Jorion pointed out from his
anthropological studies of various communities [32]. This
view does not really contradict the usual pricing law of
supply and demand in a linear regime (a continuum of
status), but it allows to extend it to extreme cases, en-
abling a survival revenue notably, i.e., forms of solidarity
that go beyond mere greed and are present in an “em-
bedded” view of economy, to use Karl Polanyi’s words.
We show that small amounts of this bias are effective in
suppressing the intermittency and result in a stationary
self-replicating wealth distribution. Then the equilibrium
distribution can be found as the solution of a tractable
eigenvalue problem. The eigenvalue spectrum could also
help further dynamical studies. Indeed, a remaining de-
gree of nonstationarity could also be part of the required
stylization of human economies. Let us finally underline
that we have no substantial consideration for the wealths
distribution in terms of Pareto tail or power law [15], let-
ting this for further work, as obviously there is interest
in the topic [17].
II. THE N-AGENT MULTIPLICATIVE MODEL
IN THE CASE OF MERE RANDOM WALK
We consider here N agents of wealth wj(t) at discrete
times t = 1, 2, . . . To study the wealth distribution intrin-
sically, we set the average wealth at the start as a con-
stant w1. We want to account for the exchange of wealth
4and information among agents without any explicit mi-
croscopic mechanism. The simplest assumption is that
education of agents teaches them to stay on the crest of
gain and loss on the average. We then have a zero-sum
exchange, with only individual fluctuations [2, 5, 6, 9].
We thus model the process as a multiplicative one (often
called Gibrat’s law) with some simple added features de-
tailed below: at each time (each day) the agent engages a
given fraction β of his wealth. To make the model easier
to grasp in terms of metaphor, we set it up as follows:
w1 = 1000 (1)
wp = 400 (2)
wj(t+ 1) = wp + λ (wj(t)− wp) (3)
where we use for the multiplier λ a rectangular distribu-
tion uniformly spanning [1− β, 1 + β] for simplicity:
Π(λ) = Π0 rect
(
λ− 1
2β
)
=
1
2β
rect
(
λ− 1
2β
)
(4)
where rect is unity in the interval
[− 12 , 12]. Clearly,∫∞
0
λ Π(λ) dλ = 1 , i.e. there is no ensemble average
change in wealth in an individual process. The reader
should nevertheless be aware of the nonergodicity of such
ensembles [23]. We will see later the time scales at which
care is needed, at least when initial conditions are canon-
ical. Eq.2 introduces wp = 400 as a minimum “floor”
wealth. It is important to set the ratio
wp
w1
to values
such as 0.4 here that at least grossly represent devel-
oped economies. A simple aspect is that in this way, we
will stick to an underlying Brownian motion (a simple
Brownian motion for the logarithm of w) and preserve a
decent value for total wealth at the slumps, without need
to introduce a barrier or other nonlinearity at the small
wealth end of the distribution. Also, when it later comes
to the feedback (Sec.III, Sec.IV), the coupling itself will
have noticeable effects because it acts on nonzero wealth
for the (many) poorest agents, hence a likely role on dy-
namics. Thus, while it introduces an unneeded feature
in the present section, we retain this poverty “floor” here
and throughout the paper.
As is well known [1, 2, 5, 9, 13, 15, 23, 25, 31], start-
ing from a given initial state at t = 0, we have a diffu-
sion+drift process in the x = log(w−wp) space. Starting
from an initially single-valued distribution P (w, t = 0) ≡
δ(w−w1), in other words a distribution concentrated at
x0 = log(w1−wp), the distribution of the variable w−wp
undergoes two evolutions : it spreads diffusively like a
Gaussian in x space, thus taking the form of a parabola
in a log-log representation, and its center also drifts.
Both effects are determined by the second and first
momenta of the distribution of ` = log(λ), denoted pi(λ),
which obeys pi(`) d` = Π(λ) dλ. It is found by standard
algebra that in our case of zero-average exchange of Eq.4,
the drift velocity (per unit time in x space) is given by:
νdrift =
1
2β
((1 + β) log(1 + β)− (1− β) log(1− β))− 1
' −β
2
6
(5)
where the approximation is valid for small β. The dis-
tribution and its standard deviation σ(t) in x-space take
the form:
Pˆ (x, t) =
1
2pi
√
t
exp
(
− (x− (x0 + νdriftt))
2
2σ(t)2
)
(6)
σ(t) = 2β
√
t
4pi
(7)
as depicted in Fig.1a in log scale of w and Fig.1b in lin-
ear scale of w. The fact that there is a drift for a zero-
exchange distribution is one of the several not-so-intuitive
aspects of GBMs (see the example of Fig.2 in [24] pin-
pointing the less-intuitive aspect of multiplicative vs. ad-
ditive processes, as appears from the authors account of
a large swath of scientific history through two Bernoulli
family members and Laplace).
Apart from the two wealth ingredients w1 and wp, we
have to discuss a realistic value for β. If we had to dis-
cuss about agents faced to optimizing their utility when
risking their wealth in some bet, we could recourse to the
Kelly criterion, for instance. But our scope is distinctly
different: we rather want to calibrate the randomness of
the economy as a whole (and not as a stationary distribu-
tion, but rather vs. its dynamics), and thus in our spirit,
the choice of β rather has to be dictated by the spread
of fate for a bunch of agents of any given initial wealth:
the relative spread
∆(w−wp)
w−wp is independent of initial w
in a multiplicative process. Also, while a multiplicative
process resembles an interest rate, we should not follow
this analogy, as an interest rate is a drift, not a spread
(see [26] and [27] for calibration issues with GBMs). By
considering the width of the distribution at a typical time
of economies, t = 1000 days, about 3 years (and less than
typical periodicity of economic cycles, say 8-40 years), we
chose to home in on relatively large variations [3, 8]: Us-
ing β = 0.06, we have νdrift = −0.0036 (per day) and for
instance σ(t = 1000 days = 1.07). This seems large, but
the corresponding characteristic factor eσ = 2.92 should
be applied to (w − wp), whose most frequent or median
value is expected to be closer to wp than to w1. So we
describe, over a duration of 1000 days, a spread from,
say w = 600 (w = wp + 200) to the 1-standard-deviation
interval [400+200e−σ, 400+200eσ] ' [469, 983]. See the
discussion section for further comments.
We now turn our attention to the fate of the whole
set of N agents. We pinpoint the role of the wealth-
iest agents in determining the overall fate of the en-
semble [1, 3, 5, 15, 18, 30]. Since we have an analyti-
cal form of the wealth distribution, we can deduce the
5FIG. 2. (Color online) Log-log plot of N/k-iles xN/k(t)
(dashed lines) as a function of time for N = 3 600, β = 0.06,
as defined by Eq.9, i.e. the point in the Gaussian distribution
such that the partial probability above xN/k(t) is (k/N). The
curve k = 1 is superimposed as a solid dark magenta line.
The largest of N wealth lies, around and above xN (t), plotted
with an added solid line. The largest wealth from several sim-
ulations are shown at selected time points (green dots), the
fraction of points above xN/k(t) at a given time t showing the
expected rarefaction trend with decreasing k.
statistics of the wealthiest agents at time t [31]. We do
not embark on this exercise rigorously [15], though, we
only remark in passing that extremes are key to non-
ergodicity demonstrations (Eq. (7) in Ref. [23]), but
rarely explicit. We can get enough indication of the
location of the maxima by a simpler use of the Gaus-
sian normal distribution [31]: if we have N realizations
of a Gaussian variable, we have a good approximation
of the statistics of the largest by slicing the Gaussian
into N slices of even weight (see work on electron re-
laxation bottleneck in quantum boxes [33, 34] for a sim-
ilar use of a Poissonian statistics). The N -th slice is
an acceptable approximation of the distribution of the
largest wealth, in spite of its abrupt cut-off, avoiding
the more tedious math of the theory of extrema [15, 31].
What is interesting for us is the ability to use the com-
plementary error function erfc(x) and its inverse erfc−1
to deal with the main aspect of such statistics. This is
simpler to grasp, for those less familiar with extremal
laws, than using the exact Gumbel law, i.e. expressing
the cumulant U(x) of the largest value distribution in a
form often denoted U(x) = exp(− exp(−z(x,N))), with
z(x,N) = [x − a(N)]/b(N) with analytical expressions
of a(N) and b(N): the typical error by taking this naive
mean instead of the exact one is ∼ 0.2 standard devia-
tion, thus an (e0.2 − 1) ∼ 20% error.
With just a little more generality, we look for the edge
xN/k of what we can term as the N/k-th slice, with k = 1
for the largest, k = 2 for the two largest, etc. in the spirit
of quantiles [15, 18, 19]. And we also allow ourselves to
use a fractional k, e.g. k = 0.25 in N/k in order to target
a range reached by the largest variable only in 25% of
the statistical events. We shall call these approximate
quantile boundaries those of the N/k-iles, generalizing
on deciles or centiles, notably in the plot of Fig.2 below.
Specifically, using standard Gaussian statistics, we iden-
tify the moving edge xN/k of the N/k-th slice accounting
for the N/k-iles statistics such that
∫ ∞
xN/k(t)
Pˆ (x, t) dx =
k
N
(8)
xN/k(t) = (x0 + νdriftt) +
√
2σ(t) erfc−1
(
k
N
)
(9)
Note that the second formula takes into account the
center drift. If we run a simulation of N agents during
a long enough time, we expect xN/k(t) to first feel the
influence of the diffusion and the erfc−1 function. In a
log-log scale, the largest element (k = 1) is the upper
envelope of the set of the N xj(t) = log (wj(t)) traces.
If we neglect drift, at short times, we have xN/k(t) −
x0 ∝
√
t = exp(log(t/2)), so we start with a set of rising
exponentials with just different coefficients as a function
of k, namely the coefficients erfc−1(k/N) whose trend
against k is logarithmic. This can be seen on the left of
Fig.2, for N = 3 600, where a set of several k values is
represented, with k = 1, i.e. the N -ile of the Gaussian,
shown as a magenta solid curve superimposed over the
set of dashed-lines for other k values.
Now, at long times, since we have a negative drift,
as illustrated by Fig.1a, even though the standard devia-
tion grows, the average locations of the N/k-iles must all,
sooner or later, shift left to x→ −∞ . More precisely, the
smaller k the later the trend of increasing xN/k(t) (i.e.
diffusion) is reversed by drift to a decreasing one [15].
This is the essence of the mechanism allowing the break-
down of GBM ergodicity as noted in [23]. In other words,
it demands too small a fraction of the sample (much less
than N−1, thus less than one agent) to get a chance of
realizing high values in the tail, even though such values
carry a major contribution to the (unbound) expectation
value in a continuum view.
We have added on Fig.2 the plot of extremal values
at selected logarithmically spaced times drawn from a
set of eight numerical simulations up to tmax = 55 000
“days” (about 150 “years”), using the resident random
MATLAB generator. Let us comment for instance the
outsiders which are the highest points situated around
the “N/0.01-ile” curve. Since we chose to sample about
75 points per curve, hence 600 points for 8 curves, the
hundred-times rarefaction vs. k = 1 entails, probabilis-
tically, a number of points around the N/0.01-iles of the
order of 6. If we look only around the maximum of
the data, the trend-reversal region of the curves around
t = 20 000 ± 15 000, where these outsider points are
6FIG. 3. (Color online) Average wealth of eight simulations
(solid lines of different colors) with the same parameters N =
3 600, β = 0.06. The initial Brownian-like motion around
w1 (level indicated by the right-side dashed line) is gradually
suffering larger and larger fluctuation, essentially associated
to the large xN (t) at intermediate times (t ∼ 15 000−30 000).
At larger times, the drift eventually dominates and the aver-
age wealth is stuck to the poverty level wp (indicated by the
left-side dashed line).
more clearly seen than at earlier times, we are concerned
with a subset of about 160 points, and we find around 2
to 4 points in this subset instead of the 1.6 expectation,
a reasonable amount for a random draw of this kind (fac-
toring also our approximate extremal law).
The above exercise is useful to grasp how the Gaus-
sian statistics can be sampled along a long time series:
we may, at some times, and provided that we are not
restrained by correlation (hence at the lower limit, not
at the scale of two adjacent times with w(t+ 1) and w(t)
separated by less than a factor β) [28], reach values much
higher than xN (t) in a given simulation.
Let us now focus on the global wealth. Although the
statistical average of a single operation is zero, actual op-
erations have some nonzero average. This emphasizes the
role of discretization [9, 15](again, ergodicity breakdown
is the overarching issue [23, 25]). At the start, with all
w’s of the same order ∼ w1, fluctuations of this origin
cancel out reasonably well: as N−1/2 at a given time.
Further along the time series, they pull also randomly
up or down. So for some time after the start, the average
wealth gently performs a Brownian random walk around
w1 (and the total wealth around Nw1), as seen on the
very left side of Fig.3 on a linear time scale.
But, as time goes and the largest agents wealth samples
values around xN/k(t) for k = 1 easily, and further at
even smaller k values, large fluctuations are introduced
on the total, and thus on the average wealth. This is the
“tail of the dog”, but here the tail is not “wagging the
dog” forever, as actually there is independence of the N
agents wealth, so the stronger fluctuations of the average
wealth only reflect the inescapable maximum regions of
the curves of Fig.2, when the diffusion to large wealth
is compensated by the slow drift in the x-space (also an
onset of apparent ergodicity breakdown). The β2 scaling
of the drift velocity shows how discretization, and thus
β, is a significant (but not critical) parameter.
We can deduce the order of magnitude of most quan-
tities as a function of N and β, the sole relevant param-
eters at this stage, using the approximate drift and the
approximate extremal law:
xN/k(t) '
(
x0 − β
2
6
t
)
+
√
2
pi
β
√
t erfc−1
(
k
N
)
(10)
tmaxN/k '
18
piβ2
(
erfc−1
(
k
N
))2
(11)
xmaxN/k ' x0 +
3
pi
(
erfc−1
(
k
N
))2
(12)
where the two last lines point the maximum of the first
line. For instance in our case N = 3 600, we obtain for
the N -ile position: tmaxN ' 3 600 and xmaxN − x0 ' 6.31 =
2.74 log(10), meaning that the edge of the richest N -ile
slice is around (w − wp) ∼ 102.74 (w1 − wp) = 550(w1 −
wp) ' 3.30 105 (the crude approximation erfc−1(u) '
[− log(u)]1/2 is thus too coarse).
Hence, we can also understand that the typical time
frame of the large intermittency window can be as-
signed a practical interval such as [tmaxN , log(100) t
max
N ] '
[10 520, 48 530], with an upper boundary taken here so as
to be exceeded only in one out of 100 cases: the statisti-
cal character of this upper boundary is apparent through
the presence of a smaller but clear isolated intermittency
peak at t ∼ 42 000 ∼ log(50)tmaxN in one of our eight sim-
ulations. The typical time scale of the intermittencies
is more difficult to provide [8, 10, 11], but it is logical
that it appears as only a fraction of tmaxN because it takes
less time than this for extreme fluctuations to enter and
leave the extreme domain (tmaxN is the time to go from
average wealth to extreme wealth for the fastest of N
elements). From the point of view of realism [3], since
tmaxN is about 30 years, we have here a confirmation that
our β = 0.06 daily value is not that large: this time scale
of 30 years is not incongruous with that of actual major
crisis in capitalist economies.
Last, the typical large deviations of the average are
on the order of a few times the naive quantity (w1 −
wp) exp(x
max
N )/N found when counting the role of a
single wealthy agent as causing the fluctuation in the
mean: this quantity associated to k = 1 is small,
(w1 − wp) × 550/3 600 = 91.7. But we have enough
time in one run, given the relatively flat situation around
tmaxN , to sample rarefied maxima with smaller k, typically
k ∼ 0.25 in one run. Then the above quantity becomes
(w1 − wp) exp(xmaxN/4)/N , which is about 2 000. On few
(statistically on one) of our eight runs, we can of course
experience eight times scarcer cases (k = 132 ) reaching a
maximum average at ∼ 12 000.
7We now comment the β = 0.06 connection with N . If
one takes for N the population of a large city, N ∼ 107,
then, since 3 6002 ∼ 1.2 107 , we get at given β essen-
tially a doubling of xmaxN and t
max
N since
[
erfc−1
(
1
N
)]2 ∼
log(N). So if we wish to retain the same character-
istic time, a couple of decades, we have to modulate
β = 0.06 by a factor
√
2 (and going to the world pop-
ulation N ∼ 1010 would demand a factor of 2 [3, 6, 8]).
Having explored an ensemble of N perfectly non in-
teracting agents, we next implement a mechanism for
the tail to be “wagging the dog”. Overall, the dynam-
ics of the global wealth of our simple non-interacting set
of N GBM epitomizes how delicate it is to describe the
region of largest manifestation of ergodicity breakdown.
We conjecture that clarifying its dynamics would be help-
ful for the understanding of related models.
III. THE N-AGENT MULTIPLICATIVE MODEL
WITH RESET AVERAGE
We now consider a feedback mechanism that consists
in resetting the average at its initial w1 value at all times.
This will therefore introduce correlations [28] and will im-
print the intermittent dynamics of the total wealth onto
the whole distribution, paralleling the way emerging so-
cial structures affect all corners of society. The above
model of independent agents with its indefinite downward
drift that accumulates all agents wealth to the poverty
“floor”cannot inspire even a stylized description of eco-
nomic reality. We do not want to affect the multiplicative
aspect (the GBM), however. Technically, we simply im-
pose, for all agents j :
wj(t+ 1) = λ(j, t)wj(t)×
∑N
m=1 λ(m, t)wm(t)
N w1
(13)
where we made explicit the random variable draw for
the j-th agent at time t, following the distribution law of
Eq.3.
Most usual discussions of “normalization” in agent-
based simulations are about the growth rate. They are
also invoked in several works on random Brownian mo-
tion and thus GBM, but we could not find the conse-
quences that we find here [1, 3, 5, 9, 13, 15]. We shall dis-
cuss in Sec.V the socio-economic meaning of this choice.
In our model, it is most instructive to visualize the fate
of the extreme wealth and that of the whole distribution
under this new assumption, as we propose through Fig.4
and Fig.5(a-c) respectively. Of course the word “fate”
means here all the coupled dynamics of society and in-
equality, with its distribution of events, correlations, and
characteristic times.
In Fig.4, we see that under the new assumption of
mean normalization, once large wealth are obtained, the
downward drift is canceled: the maximal wealth remain
FIG. 4. (Color online): Same log-log plot of maximum wealth
vs. time as Fig.2, in the case of reset average, i.e. forced
normalization of the total wealth to N w1. After reaching
the point of maximum wealth expectation without reset, the
permanent regime retains a fluctuation pattern similar to that
occurring around the maximum.
around the established level xmaxN , and display large fluc-
tuations. We thus operate permanently at the brink of
ergodicity. We give a microscopic look into the distri-
bution of wealth thanks to Fig.5(a), a color map of his-
tograms fabricated at linearly spaced times t (spacing
∆t ∼ 30 days), by integrating over ∆t.
We can now see that there are collective collapses of the
wealth distribution core, down to values close to wp, as
soon as there is a chance that the largest value reaches
xmaxN , say from t ∼ 3 000 days on (the analytical value
xmaxN can be reached for the first time at a moderate
fraction of tmaxN , not surprisingly from the general above
analysis of Sec.II).
Also striking is the fact that these collapses are fol-
lowed by revivals, some of them as developed as the start
sequence (where we remind that all wj start from w1),
with an overall intermittency pattern. Since we have seen
above that there would be occurrences of large average
wealth deviations, and that they are due to very few in-
dividuals down to a single one, we infer that the same
mechanism works here: once an agent is becoming the
wealthiest in a steady enough way (that perturbs only
marginally the distribution), it suffices that this wealthy
agent undergoes larger fluctuations to induce an over-
all fluctuation of the masses (see the treatment of firms
death in Ref. [15] with extremal law statistics: it provides
a resembling, but not directly comparable pattern). That
is what we picture as “the tail wagging the dog”.
In terms of current analysis of GBM-based economics
models, we should be looking at time-constant distribu-
tions of different classes of agents, and at their corre-
lation. This would be a highly rewarding analysis if the
resulting dynamics can be correlated to the available eco-
nomic data through not only the trends of inequality, but
8FIG. 5. (Color online): Illustration of a typical sample of
wealth wN (t) under the reset-to-average assumption. (a) His-
togram of wealth using a few hundred log-spaced bins, show-
ing intermittency at multiple time scales; (b) the sorted tra-
jectories of wj − wp for selected wj ’s. Note the correlation
among the majority of small wealth, but note that there is
rather an anticorrelation among this vast majority and the
top three wealths; (c) Gini coefficient of the distribution vs.
time, with large random fluctuations that still bear the sig-
natures of intermittency of the few wealthiest agents.
also economic, sectoral and territorial discrepancies. The
fact that we can see a “tail” and a “dog” also points the
possibility to distinguish social classes and their line of
divide, as will be developed briefly.
The detail of the wealth fate can be perceived in
Fig.5(b), where we plot on a log scale a selection of the
sorted temporal profiles of wj(t) − wp . We clearly see
that the troughs apparent in the tail of the poor agents
correspond to the aftermath of a peak of the very few
wealthiest agents. In other words, in a zero-sum ex-
change game due to the fixed mean wealth, any of the
larger-than-average fluctuations of the wealthiest is felt
by essentially all agents, and can be felt as a big shock.
Let us present our distributions of wealth as a pre-
ferred economic indicator. Although fundamental ones
have recently been proposed in relations with GBMs
[24, 25], we present in Fig.5(c) the well-known Gini coef-
ficient [29, 35]. Its variations are clearly triggered by the
few wealthiest agents. The curve shapes are not identical,
but the major peaks, troughs and shoulders are clearly
correlated. These curves contain both (i) the dynamics of
inequality in terms of distribution of time constants, in-
sofar as a picture of subsets with a reasonable stationary
distribution of time constants applies, (ii) an indication
of the amount of correlation within agents, as they ac-
count for the amplitude of the fluctuation.
As for the possibility to define subsets, since we have
seen that the largest fluctuations are the leading events,
we try below to define two dynamical “classes”, separated
by a “water divide” line of wealth flow. Such a picture
may provide an account of the actual GBMs mechanisms
and invite resonances for the stylization step between
model and economic reality.
Specifically, we elaborate a color map of a matrix de-
scribing the flux pattern between agent pairs (i, j), as is
done in Fig.6. Mathematically, we work on the sorted se-
ries of wealth: we take first the product of the time series
of the sorted wealth derivatives, yj = dwj/dt , and we
then fabricate a log-type indicator of the absolute value,
but we keep track of the sign of the product to distinguish
between gain and losses:
Ai,j =
t=tmax∑
t=1
[
w
(s)
i (t+ 1)− w(s)i (t)
] [
w
(s)
j (t+ 1)− w(s)j (t)
]
≡
∫ t=tmax
t=0
[
dw
(s)
i
dt
] [
dw
(s)
j
dt
]
dt
Ci,j = sign(Ai,j) [log(Ai,j)]
2
, (14)
where the superscript (s) denotes the sorted ensemble
(dynamical sorting at all time t, so it scrambles the actual
agents throughout the simulation time).
In Fig.6, we clearly see a negative correlation between
the first four agents (i = 1 to 4) and all agents beyond
j ∼ 200. The zoom on the low-(i, j)-corner at the top-
left of this matrix, shows that till values of the indices
(i, j) ∼ 12, the correlation is still not clear cut, although
the trend toward positive correlation increases for smaller
(i, j). This is a signature that we have a fairly abrupt
partition between the wealthiest and the mass (a mass
that includes the 10 − 100 “affluent” wealthiest out of
N = 3 600), the former influencing the overall fate by
attracting wealth from all other agents [3, 5, 11, 12, 18].
Thus, our indicator tells how to define two “effective
classes”, separated by the “water divide” of wealth flow,
on the average. The fact that it is not a single agent
is of good omen for the application of the model. Play-
ing with the basic GBM parameters (N, β and the ratio
wp/w1), the relative size of this class would evolve from
this ∼ 0.1% to another fraction. The inner fluxes inside
9FIG. 6. (Color online): Correlation analysis on ranked wealth.
See text and Eq.14 on the particular correlation-based indi-
cator Ci,j used here. We represent as a color a quantity mea-
suring the fluxes and their signs, between the affluent and the
poorest of the agents, with a step-wise logarithmic sampling
of the 3 600 × 3 600 matrix. Note that the anticorrelation is
neatly defined, and that it clearly stems in this graph from
gains of the few richest. The inset on the bottom left is a
zoom on the ∼ 40 wealthiest agents.
each class could be studied in order to further partition
each of these “basin” of the water divide picture. Then, a
reverse procedure could help establishing sensible clever
GBM nonlinearities, for example a β(N,w) dependence,
that could help mapping actual econometric data sets
into GBM models with somehow socially agnostic as-
sumptions. The dynamics of each subset equally deserves
attention [25–28].
What we can do with modest effort is to examine
Fig.5(b) in more detail to get qualitative clues on the
dynamics. If we look at the lower part of the distribu-
tion, well below the “water divide”, the large intermit-
tency features are more and more quickly washed out as
we go to small wealth, and the main governing factor
seems to be the negative impact of the aggregate wealth.
If we now look at the population across all times, in
Fig.6 color map, we see that, as is logical, the indica-
tor tends to vanish for the least wealthy agents (blue-
green shades at the bottom right). The absence of ran-
domness of the indicators sign occuring for the small-
est wealth suggests that their inter-exchange (that takes
place in principle through the forced averaging process
which includes their own collective fluctuation) is a mi-
nority mechanism. Their fate is dominated, as is obvious
from the overall distribution in time, by the influences
of wealthiest: the trickle-down effect in recovery phases
(when the wealthiest give or “emit” wealth) or the aus-
terity effect in collapse phases.
We have now examined a canonical version of our mul-
tiplicative wealth model. Once sufficiently large wealth
are generated, there is a regime of boom and busts, with
abrupt collapses and slower revivals, due to the coupling
induced by the constant average. Fluctuations of the
richest are enough to cause large swaths of the popu-
lation to be affected within short times. More analysis
would entail tools such as momenta or Laplace trans-
forms, with a scope of finding “excited modes” of the
distribution. While this has a simple sense around equi-
librium, we have no clues as to what are excited modes
in a deeply nonstationary and broken ergodicity context.
However, if we tame the nonstationarity, we may recover
a system amenable to an eigenmode (fundamental and
excited modes) analysis. The idea would then be to track
how these excited modes behave when reintroducing non-
stationarity. Taming nonstationarity and inequality in-
termittency is just the purpose of the following.
It is tempting to think of “nudging” the underlying
laws so that this intermittency regime and its induced
collapses are avoided. This entails avoiding the advent of
large wealth if we want to maintain that β itself repre-
sents a “psychological constant”, the amount associated
to risk at daily scale (scaling with the square root of
time, basically). Forbidding large bets to owners of large
wealth per se, even when they are designed well within
regulatory barriers, would be a too directive way to in-
terfere with the economic microscopic decisions. So in
Sec.IV below, we introduce a modification of the basic
probability law of our multiplicative process, Π(λ), that
averts the build-up of “extremely extreme” wealth. Sta-
tionarity is viewed as the obtainment of a fundamental
mode of the system, with the corollary that obtainment
of excited modes in the same frame is natural, but we
shall not study their dynamics in the present work.
IV: AGENT ENSEMBLE WITH RESET
AVERAGE AND WEAKLY
WEALTH-DEPENDENT MULTIPLICATIVE
PROCESS
To avoid the advent of large wealth, we first define a
“status indicator”, based on wealth here. The role of
“status” as a general factor in setting the price of ex-
changes dates back to Aristotle and was revived in social
science and anthropology by P. Jorion [20, 30, 32], with
the aim of escaping the conventional wisdom of prices
fluctuating around a “fundamental price” that an undis-
torted market is supposed to reveal (see also the final
discussion). Aside such general views, a “status indica-
tor” would be a good channel to link in the future our
deliberately limited study to more complex ones with a
developed social account [4, 18, 22, 29]. We cannot use
the “intrinsic” classes defined by the “water divide”, be-
cause they correspond to time average of a nonstationary
process, so that they are not known until the relevant
fluctuations did take place. We thus find it sensible to
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define a continuous status without connection to the non-
stationary dynamics. Here, our status indicator denoted
Sj is a simple homographic function based on the com-
parison of wealth above poverty to average wealth:
Sj(t) =
wj(t)− wp
w1 + (wj(t)− wp) (15)
So it tends to unity for large wealth, is one-half for w =
w1 + wp ( w = 1 400 in our case), and tends to zero for
w → wp . We then modify Π(λ) to introduce a counter-
acting bias. Specifically, we make Π(λ) status-dependent
(S-dependent) using a skew factor ε as follows:
Πε(λ) = Π1(ε, S) rect
(
λ− (1 + εS)
2β(1 + εS)
)
=
1
2β(1 + εS)
rect
(
λ− (1 + εS)
2β(1 + εS)
)
(16)
So Πε(λ) is centered at its centroid λ¯ = 1 + εS , span-
ning uniformly the range 1−β → 1+β(1+2εS). Techni-
cally, we obtain it as (1+β[1−2 rand])(1+εS) instead of
1+β[1−2 rand] for Eq.3(c), rand being the usual uniform
random variable in [0, 1].
We see that ε plays the role of a wealth amplifier if
ε > 0: the wealthiest entities turn exchanges to their
advantage, a well-known fact, evidenced by Piketty using
the yields of the funds of US universities [19]. It plays
the role of a taxation mechanism if ε < 0, pushing the
average factor λ¯ to more than unity for the poorest and
less than unity for the wealthiest.
We shall see that, surprisingly, very small skew fac-
tors ε are sufficient to avoid the build up of large wealth.
Or not so surprisingly, as it boils down to inhibiting the
growth of the very few large wealth agents of the his-
togram that was built up in years, not days. If this
distribution is diminished at large wealth by a modest
factor per octave, then, since concerned agents are 10 or
more octaves wealthier than the median (210 ∼ 1 000,
cf. Eq.12 and the 102.74 factor that gave the maximum
N-ile at 550(w1 − wp) ' 3.30 105), it provides a signifi-
cant inhibition of the tail. We will report below efforts
to quantify the stationary distribution that results from
this modification. Let us examine the impact of ε 6= 0
through simulations first, using all other parameters as
before.
In Fig.7, we examine the wealthiest agent evolution for
various skew parameters ε. We have left as a guide the
curves of the (N/k)-iles of Sec.II. We see that the modifi-
cation does have the expected effect, and that this effect
is large even for ε values as small as ε = −0.005. The
effect is not symmetric as we already evolve at ε = 0 in
a situation of extreme wealth reaching a large fraction
of the total wealth: there is little room to expand more
the wealth, and the distribution clearly saturates (akin
FIG. 7. (Color online): Fate of the richest wealth under dif-
ferent assumptions for the skew parameter ε. The analytical
curves provided for the simple case of no skew and no reset
in Sec. II are left as a guide to the eye.
FIG. 8. (Color online): Gini coefficient under different as-
sumptions for the skew parameter ε as indicated.
to wealth condensation) for the ε = 0.03 skew (positive
feedback) parameter shown here. For negative skew pa-
rameters ε, we see that the wealthiest values clearly di-
minish by about 1.5 decade for ε = − 0.03. At the same
time, relative fluctuations tend to diminish (graphically
obvious in log scale).
In Fig.8, we show the Gini coefficient evolution for var-
ious values of the skew parameter ε. The largest fluctua-
tions are those of ε = 0.03, but, as said, they “bump” on
the ceiling of wealth saturation. Also, due to the posi-
tive feedback and the subsequent roll-off of large wealth,
variations are very quick. For negative values of ε, now,
fluctuations of the Gini coefficient diminish clearly even
for ε = −0.005. And as the distribution finds a stationary
shape, these fluctuations nearly vanish for ε = − 0.03.
In Fig.9, we illustrate the evolution for ε = − 0.005,
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FIG. 9. (Color online)(a-e) For a simulation with a small negative skew parameter ε = −0.005, the evolution is depicted: (a)
the histogram of wealth distributions as a color map coded as (d-e); (b) selected sorted wealth from highest to lowest, showing
the few occurrences of anti-correlation at times 36 000 and 45 000 ; (c) the Gini coefficient, with spikes at those moments; (d)
and shows the histogram for a case of large positive skew parameter +0.03, with extreme intermittency; (e) shows the case of
a large negative skew parameter −0.03, with a very steady situation.
an interesting limit in our simulations window (a win-
dow intended to describe boom-and-bust cycles at the
∼ 2 centuries scale). We see in Fig.9(a) that the distri-
bution histogram is stable most of the time, but still vul-
nerable to intermittent limited collapses, at t = 36 000
and t = 45 000. At these points, the wealthiest agent
clearly exhibits an anti-correlation with most others, and
shakes the whole distribution, see Fig.9(b), as identified
on similar earlier graphs. These are the points of surging
Gini coefficient, as is seen on Fig.9(c), albeit by a mod-
erate amount. For the sake of comparison, we provide on
Fig.9(d,e) histograms of the two extreme and contrasted
situations ε = ± 0.03. In the positive case, we see that
the evolution is a tale of few moments of “shared pros-
perity” and many moments of utter inequality. But as
soon as an agent takes over, it acts over the whole distri-
bution, and it is “wagging” all the distribution very soon
(∼ 1000 days scale, that corresponds to periods such as
revolutions). And in the negative case, stabilization is
obtained early, only gentle fluctuations are seen in those
slices of rarefied statistics, indicating by contrast that all
slices below operate in a stationary stabilized and bal-
anced regime.
In Fig.10, we show the same correlation map with the
quantity Ci,j defined above as in Fig.6, but for a negative
intermediate value of the skew parameter ε = − 0.015.
The “water divide” line between the richest and the
poorest is now lying around a gentle intermediate value,
around the 300-th of the ranked agents. This is likely to
coincide with the mean wealth w1, but we have not ex-
amined this in detail. There are a few spurious positive
correlations on lines next to the diagonal. We believe
they stem from the choice of using an indicator based on
sorted distribution. The sorting introduces correlation
between adjacent ranks, if they both mostly suffer from
other agents, but just spend some time “crisscrossing”.
Anyway, it does not perturb much the overall picture,
but rather indicates that the next steps in such simula-
tions would be to understand, as in many current physics
problems, the role of correlations [11, 12, 22, 29], which
is a general concern in the newly emerged considerations
of GBMs [25–28].
In Fig.11(a) we show the histogram of wealth distribu-
tion at t = 55 000 for various simulations. Depending on
the skew parameter ε, we see clear indices of the mech-
anisms operating for these different distributions. For a
skew parameter ε ≥ 0, we see strongly populated peaks
that “scar” the left side of the distribution, some of them
not so far from the main peak. The distribution is broad,
and we also see on the large wealth tail a few peaks with
one or a few individuals that are above the trend of the
tail at lower values. Both indications are logical with the
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FIG. 10. (Color online) Map of correlation of wealth varia-
tions, Ci,j , among sorted agent records, for a negative skew
coefficient 0.015 as in Fig.6. The transition from positive to
negative fluxes is smooth and lies around i, j ∼ 300, it is
smooth and has no strong values, except close to the diagonal
(artifact of correlation when ranked agents “cross”).
mechanism of “the tail wagging the dog”. We see now
somewhat more in detail that there are highly populated
sets of agents that were in some narrow interval close to
wp, and that benefited from an upward kick when the
wealthiest agents fluctuated downward. The statistical
characteristics of these intermittent bunches may be an
interesting part of future work, in relation with GBM
dynamics.
As for the distributions for ε < 0, they clearly get
narrower as ε becomes more negative, and logically, they
tend to become stationary. The equilibration time [8, 26,
27] is shorter for the more negative values of ε. We now
have a clearer view of how the distribution is curtailed
on the high end: by a decade or so around w = 105, for
the case ε = −0.015 vs. the reference ε=0. The fact
that such a small skew could avert the large fluctuations
initially surprised us (somehow as the diverging feedback
of inequality in the reallocation+GBM model of Ref. [27]
surprised their authors). But considering the effects of
the residual drift that we explored in Sec.II, it is not so
surprising that a very limited but “daily” drift acts in
such a large manner.
Since a stationary distribution results, we can deter-
mine it, thus allowing comparison with the broad litera-
ture addressing this topic [6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 26, 28, 29, 36].
It is possible because we can assume that the normaliza-
tion mechanism does not play a role anymore [13, 14].
The signature of this mechanism was the set of peaks
or bunches on the left side of the distributions. They
are still seen in the limit case ε = − 0.005 and are as-
sociated to very modest wealth steps values (less than
unity, hence ∼ (w1−wp)/600), thus to a small impact of
the normalization acting on modestly large wealth. Such
effects apparently rarefy and vanish for more negative
values within our simulation bounds.
To find the stationary limit, we do not need detailed
balance as exchanges are not explicitly accounted in our
model. We have to solve the functional integral equation:
P (w) =
∫ +∞
wp
P (w′)Πε(λ) dλ, (17)
which accounts for a single time step in a mean-field view,
assuming as a boundary condition that no probability
flux comes from the region close to wp. We should also
care that the probability Πε(λ) is actually coupled to w
by the status factor. A full notation would be Π(w′, λ) or
Π(S(w′), λ). However the numerical values in this equa-
tion are spread on decades. So we can transpose this in
the {x, `} space, whose (now stationary) probability law
and multiplier law are respectively Pˆ (x) and pi(`). With
the now additive algebra, given that x′+ ` = x, and with
an adequate redefinition of pi(`) into piε(`) to incorporate
the status S, we find:
Pˆ (x) =
∫ +∞
−∞
Pˆ (x− `)piε(`) d` (18)
This form is reminiscent of a convolution (as it should).
But due to the dependence of piε(`) on x through the
status S, it is not a convolution. Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible to solve for this equation in the form of an eigenvalue
problem onto a discretized and uniform set {xm = m∆x}
of M values of x. Also, in the limit of a large enough
number of iterations, we can remember that the fate
of the distribution was given at ε = 0 by its drift and
second momentum (diffusion constant, essentially β for
us) [1, 2, 9, 15]. While we do not have a theorem to
extend this to the case ε 6= 0, we conjecture that the
first-order findings we want can be made retaining this
assumption. So the matrix representing Eq.17 as an op-
erator on Pˆ is built up as a Toeplitz matrix, with the
n-th diagonal having a coefficient piε(n δx) . This intro-
duces a constraint as we want to span several decades
(12 decades, see below) , so that even in a large ensemble
{xm = m∆x} with an M value of a few thousand, only
a few of these values fall within the modest range located
between extrema of ` , essentially log(1± β), apart from
the small corrective action that describes the law piε(`).
However, with some care on this sampling, and given
the assumption mentioned above, we could find signifi-
cant solutions with matrix sizes M of a few thousand,
and typically 10− 20 filled diagonals. Then, a significant
piε(`) can still be put up by operating on the rows of the
matrix, shifting the centroid of the piε(`) distribution to
the proper drift-induced value equivalent to Eq.16, but
not taking into account the modified width of the distri-
bution. This introduces some second-order effects when
it comes to converge to a stationary distribution.
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FIG. 11. (Color online)(a) Histograms of (w − wp) on log-
log scale, for various skew parameters as indicated at a large
enough time to escape the initial phase. Note the spikes on the
left side of the distributions down to parameter −0.005, that
are created at the “bust” events of wealthiest agents. Spikes
at the right end are the few wealthiest agents; (b) Eigenmodes
associated to the largest (unity) eigenvalue for the continuous
model without the normalization effect, for negative values of
the skew parameter. For too weak values, there is no solution
within the simulation space, the distribution is at the verge
of unstable negative drift, and hence the eigenmodes explore
boundaries.
Fig.11(b) shows the result of this approach using a set
spanning 12 decades. We indeed find that the largest
eigenvalue of our matrix is nearly unity, and its eigen-
vector is generally a bell-shaped distribution. For too
weak negative values of ε, about |ε| < 0.002, the dis-
tribution peaks near the truncating boundary condition
that we implemented at the lowest x values. Just because
we do not normalize the rows of the matrix at its “cor-
ners”, the probability can be “dissipated” there, and the
drift+diffusion processes must accommodate this numer-
ical boundary. Such a typical appearance, provided here
for ε = −0.001, means physically that the distribution is
still dominated by the negative drift and is not station-
ary, essentially as in Sec.II (but not really as in Sec.III
as Eq.17 ignores the total wealth renormalization).
For more negative values of ε , we find stationary bell-
shaped curves. They present most of the characters of the
actual distribution: there is notably a shift to the right
and to a narrower distribution that is quite comparable
to the simulation of Fig.11(a). However, we suspect that
our solving procedure is not accurate enough to attempt
a meaningful fit: a better numerical solution should be
sought. Even without an exact account of our model, we
can nevertheless discuss its benefits.
An interesting exercise around the class of station-
ary distributions that are currently under scrutiny is to
attempt to look at the relaxation rates of the excited
states [27]. Very plausibly, the relaxation rates will be
faster for the higher excited states, and the first excited
state [26] gives a measure of the most relevant time scale
for external shocks that affect inequality, i.e., that affect
differentially the rich and poor agents. Nonlinearities
could also be investigated in terms of the effect of cor-
relation. Naively, letting an initial state evolve from the
two linear combinations |p〉 ± |q〉 of the p-th and q-th
modes could modify the relaxation rate due to the sta-
tus term, as this latter is not respecting any of the mode
orthogonality conditions.
V. DISCUSSION
The quest for econophysics models to understand in-
equality recently evolved from the study of stationary
distributions [2, 4, 5, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 22, 29, 30] to the
much more fascinating issue of the distribution dynam-
ics [25–28]. The simple tool of GBM gives insight to such
models, not least because it addresses some limitation of
mainstream economics (e.g. a bounded utility function),
but also because it helps tackling the false intuitions that
arise when ergodicity breaking is not properly taken into
account [23, 24].
Setting up a model with a finite number of agents and
a fine-grain (“daily”) time discretization, we have intro-
duced a nonstationary regime of sustained intermittency
by using the normalization of the total wealth. A lively
dynamics emerges, with still much to analyze. The num-
ber of agent used in the simulations (N = 3 600) was
enough to attain in a reasonable time scale the situation
of an extreme degree in wealth capture by a few individ-
uals, whose decisions then impact the fate of all agents
within short times (say, few months), but not in any cir-
cumstances, rather only once a crisis is triggered [15].
The way the fluxes have their signs undergoing inversion
when scanning in a sorted agent distribution (Fig.6 and
Fig.10) is one of the most meaningful signatures we got.
It defines two natural subsets across a “water divide” of
wealth flow. Their coupled fate can then be captured
in a nutshell by the “tail wagging the dog” metaphor.
It could be applied to actual statistics or to any of the
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many more explicit models. Sticking to the dynamics of
subsets and aggregates, we would have tools that remain
intrinsic or “agnostic” enough along this line. We are
also aware that calibration of GBMs is in infancy and
will by itself reveal several features of interest or even
prompt new uses of GBMs.
Also, generally speaking, when inside a general large
system, a subsystem presents sufficient stationarity, its
degree of redistribution could be studied with an appro-
priate scaling of N [6, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16](we considered only
GBMs coupled by the normalization, but an absence of
reallocation in the sense of [27]). The comparison is
not limited to wealth as traditionally quantized in eco-
nomics, it can be adapted to various cases around the
general balance idea. This principle entails the statis-
tical fairness in the microscopic trend (as much chance
to get more than less in a single event), but neverthe-
less the small gain of a minority in relative terms ap-
pears to be self-amplifying, even weakly. This could be
for instance the fate of fashionable topics in a domain
of science, where the developing trend first looks like a
fair reward, but if it becomes a dominant trend, it can
lead to too many followers and production of apparent
knowledge with little actual relevance in a majority of
cases [35]. As several of these domains are not as long-
lived as human economies, it makes sense to start simu-
lation from an apparently stationary distribution. Then,
the issue of dynamics has a simple focal point: how much
the first main crisis can be anticipated (see the rich stud-
ies on firm births and deaths [15]), or more precisely: can
we find how the onset of crisis can be described in a more
detailed fashion, e.g. by connecting its probability to all
average features/momenta of the wealth distribution or
of its underlying log-scale counterpart ?
In the economic domain, the large intermittency is of-
ten linked to the Black Swan paradigm of Nassim. N.
Taleb, which relates rather to bust phases, but it is more
difficult to assign “white” or“withish” swans in the pos-
itive boom phase of cycles among the impact of techno-
logical, societal or political changes. Microscopic studies
of different sectors and their interactions could benefit
from the a comparison with our kind of stochastic model
in this respect.
After such “microscopic” considerations, let us take
briefly a broader perspective: Our initial intention, that
we hope to be still present in the result, was to put
Piketty’s historic-economic narrative [18, 19] and some
of its “obvious” consequences into a model that would
go one step beyond the stage of “riches become richer”,
with the further prospect of shedding light on how the un-
derlying networks and their concentration effects operate
in terms of statistical distribution of economic and social
variables [22, 30, 32]. On this way, we were faced with the
fact that growing inequalities and nonstationary distri-
butions occur even in the simple paradigm of apparently
local fair exchange, a result that stems from the natural
drift of a zero-sum-exchange in log-scale terms. There
was not much appearance of such issues in the econo-
physics literature until a few years ago. Then, as the
issue of evolving inequalities became more paradigmatic
with data available across the 2008 crisis, the dynamics of
inequality and the capability of GBMs to describe them
became a center of intense attention [23–28]. Indeed,
there is a interesting parallel between on the one hand
Piketty’s “divergence” of the r > g picture, whose mean-
ing is rather historical than a precise econometric exercise
(hence Piketty stops short of a divergence model), and on
the other hand the nonstationarity and ergodicity break-
ing of GBM ensembles [23–25].
Taming this nonstationarity involves no less than as-
sessing whether our economies run in a near-equilibrium
fashion, or more deeply out-of-equilibrium [27] even
though sociology and economics can track a number of
slowly drifting items that are deceivingly suggestive of an
adiabatic evolution restoring an equilibrium induced by
the noise of external shocks.
In our case, instead of introducing an explicit taxa-
tion mechanism having an extra variable and entailing
no less than the prerogatives of a “State” to run it, we
chose a more implicit or self-contained approach: Our
above presentation of the equilibrating mechanism as re-
lying on “status” is drawn from anthropological consid-
erations brought into the realm of finance and economics
by Paul Jorion, who found that the law of supply and
demand was only marginally verified in actual commu-
nities submitted to extreme risks of subsistence (fisher
communities for instance). Rather, based on Aristotle
inspiration (picked up from Karl Polanyi’s writings), the
survival of the community, and the reproduction of the
member’s status throughout its social and economic ex-
changes, was felt to be a more general factor, preventing
prices to fall too low, or on the contrary, causing the buy-
ers to have the last word even in periods of high demand
as part of their accepted higher status.
We have therefore introduced an equalizing mechanism
akin to taxation directly as an exchange bias that can be
seen also as an average price bias. The fact that with
enough corrective strength, the distribution turns from
nonstationary to stationary is no surprise. The interest-
ing point that would not have been guessed easily at first
is that a quite limited skew or bias, on the order of 1% in
the daily transaction, is sufficient to strongly suppress the
advent of inequality-induced crisis. It is admittedly not
obvious to connect (and possibly contrast) a small daily
bias on the one hand and, on the other hand, the current
conventional wisdom that yearly tax rates for the afflu-
ent must lie somewhere in a range of 15-60%. At a time
when economic models are under criticisms from several
points of views [18, 22, 29], we believe that the knowledge
brought by our simple model is a source of inspiration for
all three communities of physics, econonophysics, and the
broader social sciences that embed economics. This in-
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spiration rests on a fertile ground thanks to the recent
consideration of all GBM properties and of their subtle
consequences in inequality models [23–25, 28].
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